The Role of Government in U.S. Capital Markets
William Poole*
President, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
A Lecture Presented Before The Institute of Governmental Affairs
University of California
Davis, Calif.
Oct. 18, 2001
*I appreciate comments provided by my colleagues at the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis; Robert Rasche, William Emmons and Joel
James were especially helpful. I take full responsibility for errors.
The views expressed are mine and do not necessarily reflect official
positions of the Federal Reserve System.
The overall role of government in U. S. capital markets
is not prominent in policy discussions, nor is it well understood
by the general public. There are a number of important dimensions
to this role, and significant changes over time. My purpose today
is to outline these dimensions to provide a better understanding
of the role of government
The capital markets are the means by which the economy's saving
flows to those who use the saving. Business firms need access to
some of this saving to finance productive investment in physical
capital and to cover losses during the start-up phase of new enterprises.
Governments use some of this saving to finance outlays in excess
of current revenues. Households tap some of this saving to finance
consumption outlays and, especially, housing investments. In the
first part of my lecture, I'll outline some of the basic facts as
to how nonfinancial sectors use funds raised in the capital markets,
and some of the notable changes over time. I'll emphasize how the
government's role affects the outcome.
The financial system does not, however, transfer all funds directly
from savers to end users of funds. A large fraction of saving flows
through financial intermediaries, such as banks and mutual funds.
The government's role in the intermediation process is substantial.
That will be the subject of the next section of my lecture.
In the final section of my lecture, I'll reflect on the Federal
Reserve's role in the financial system. The Fed reflects an important
governmental influence, but one more involved in the overall management
of the economy than directly in the capital markets. Nevertheless,
the Fed's role is critical to the orderly functioning of the capital
markets, which is why this topic fits nicely into the overall topic
in the title to my lecture. Indeed, I'll emphasize just how important
the Fed has been in responding to the economic effects of the terrorist
attacks on September 11.
I've added a postscript that is off the topic, but I know of interest-I'll
reflect a bit on the likely implications of the terrorist attacks
on the economy.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that the views I express
here are mine and do not necessarily reflect official positions
of the Federal Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their comments, but retain full responsibility
for errors.
Nonfinancial Sectors Uses of Funds
Almost everyone is aware of the fact that in recent years the federal
government has changed from a net user to a net supplier of funds-the
federal budget has gone from deficit to surplus. Of course, that
situation is fluid today because of the changed situation in the
wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11. It is too early to
make any projections as to just how large the change in the federal
budget will be in coming years.
Perhaps the most familiar fact about the federal role in the capital
market is that the federal budget went from near balance in 1970
to a deficit of about 5 percent of GDP in the mid 1980s to a surplus
of about 2 ½ percent last year. Because that fact is so familiar,
I'll not dwell on it.
Less well known is the use of the credit markets by the state and
local governments. These governments have borrowed funds on a smaller
and steadier scale than the federal government for many decades.
Their net new borrowing each year was equivalent to about one percent
of GDP through the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. State and local government
borrowing spiked briefly above two percent of GDP in the mid-1980s,
before falling back to about zero by the mid-1990s. The most recent
evidence suggests state and local borrowing is set to resume its
previous pace equivalent to about one percent of GDP for the immediate
future.
Because of this relatively steady pace of borrowing, the total
amount of state and local government debt outstanding has remained
between 8 and 18 percent of GDP for the entire post-war period,
with no apparent trend in either direction. For example, state and
local government debt was equivalent to 14.5 percent of GDP in 1970,
16.1 percent in 1985, and then returned to 13.0 percent by 2000.
State and local governments not only raise funds in the capital
markets but also are important lenders. Data on lending by state
and local governments to nonfinancial borrowers are fragmentary,
and evidence on the amount of such activity is limited to recent
years. This activity is best summarized by public debt issued for
private purposes, as defined by the Bureau of the Census since fiscal
year 1987-88. The data refer to debt issued by state and local governments
or their agencies for the purpose of funding private sector activities.
Examples of activities supported by such lending activities include
industrial and commercial development, pollution control, housing
and mortgage loans, private hospital facilities, student loans and
ventures such as sports stadiums, convention centers and shopping
malls. For fiscal year 1987-88, the outstanding amount of such debt
was $246.2 billion, or approximately five percent of GDP, split
equally between state governments and local governments. By fiscal
year 1996-7, the latest period for which complete data are available,
the outstanding amount had grown to $328.2 billion-a bit less than
four percent of GDP-of which 60 percent was issued by state government
units. In recent years, state and local governments have been a
much more important source of direct loans to nonfinancial borrowers
than has the federal government.
Governments not only directly absorb or provide saving to the capital
market but also influence the use and form of capital raised by
the private sector. Of particular note is the growing use of debt
over equity by corporate business. For a corporation, debt has the
advantage that interest payments are deductible under the corporate
income tax law whereas dividend payments are not. Perhaps as a consequence
of this feature of the tax law, or at least in part, the equity
portion of capital for nonfarm, nonfinancial businesses has fallen
from 64 percent in 1970 to 50 percent today. A possible downside
aspect of this trend is that it makes corporations more vulnerable
to bankruptcy should economic conditions deteriorate significantly,
and that in turn may make the overall economy less stable.
Beyond its direct role in raising capital in the market, the government
regulates competitive conditions in the securities markets. Since
the enactment of federal securities laws in the 1930s, the emphasis
has been to provide investors with information, and not for the
government itself to make judgments as to investment merit. This
system has worked well, and most investors understand that the government
does not substitute its own judgments for those of investors.
Financial Intermediation
The flow of saving from the original saver, such as a household,
to the ultimate user of the saving, such as a corporation, can take
the form of household purchases of newly issued common stock or
corporate bonds. However, a large fraction of saving flows is intermediated
by financial firms. The classic example is the commercial bank,
which collects funds from depositors and lends to both businesses
and households.
Financial intermediaries serve several important functions. An
obvious one is that the intermediary specializes in the analysis
of risk and administration of loans. Very few households have the
lending expertise that banks do. Moreover, banks can attract funds
in small amounts from individuals and make large loans to business
firms.
The government role in supervising, regulating and insuring financial
intermediaries is much more extensive than its role in the securities
markets in which stocks and bonds are traded. The federal role regarding
financial intermediaries ranges from minimal, as with firms such
as GE Capital, to extensive, as with regulation of commercial banks
and insurance of deposits.
Of all the federal guarantee arrangements, deposit insurance is
the most fully developed and best understood. In the United States,
deposit insurance arrangements began in the early 19th
century. Through a long and painful evolution, including creation
of federal deposit insurance in the 1930s and the collapse of the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation in 1989, the management
of the deposit insurance system is now fairly well understood. There
are two pillars to the system. One is extensive regulation and supervision
of insured depository institutions by federal and state agencies.
The second is the requirement that insured institutions maintain
substantial capital, which provides a cushion against losses and
an incentive for the owners to manage their institutions carefully.
Deposit insurance serves an important function in improving the
stability of the financial system. However, it creates the risk
that insured depository institutions will engage in unsafe lending
practices that may lead to loan defaults and bank failures. An inadequate
insurance system sooner or later is likely to lead to excessive
taxpayer losses.
Federal insurance programs that cover liabilities of private financial
intermediaries date from the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC) in the 1930s. In 1970, credit union shares became insured
through the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund. The FSLIC
was abolished in 1989 and responsibility for insuring deposits of
banks and thrifts was assigned to the FDIC through two separate
funds, the Bank Insurance Fund and the Thrift Insurance Fund. As
of the end of 1999, deposits insured by the two FDIC funds exceeded
$2.8 trillion, about 71 percent of all deposits at insured banks
and 93 percent of all deposits at insured thrifts. In addition,
the National Credit Union Administration insured $326 billion dollars
in credit union shares.
The statutory responsibility of the FDIC extends only to the first
$100,000 of deposits held by a particular individual in all accounts
at a depository institution. However, as a consequence of the bailout
of Continental-Illinois Bank in 1984, it became clear that in practice
the government was following what the market usually calls a "too
big to fail" policy, but which is more properly called a "too
big to liquidate quickly" policy. Whatever term is used, the
policy means that for large banks all deposits, and not just
insured deposits, may be guaranteed; clearly though, shareholders
and managements are vulnerable to loss. The extent of this de
facto extension of government insurance of depository liabilities
beyond the statutory provisions has never been precisely defined.
In the event of problems at another large bank, the markets will
be uncertain of the extent to which the government will cover losses
that large, uninsured depositors might suffer.
Another class of financial intermediaries is government-sponsored
enterprises, or GSEs. These are instrumentalities of the federal
government and not fully private. They are established and chartered
by the federal government to accomplish specific policy goals. However,
they may have private shareholders who receive dividends and enjoy
most of the rights of fully private firms. The mission of the housing
GSEs-including Fannie Mae (originally named the Federal National
Mortgage Corporation), and Freddie Mac (originally the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation) and the Federal Home Loan Bank System-is
to facilitate the flow of credit to mortgage borrowers. In addition
to the housing GSEs, other financial GSEs include the Farm Credit
System, the Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation (Farmer Mac),
the Financing Corporation and the Refinancing Corporation (both
set up to resolve failed savings and loans in the early 1990s),
and the Student Loan Marketing Association (Sallie Mae). There are
also non-financial GSEs such as the Post Office and the Tennessee
Valley Authority.
All of the financially oriented GSEs together controlled financial
assets of $2.125 trillion at the end of the second quarter of 2001,
with the lion's share accounted for by the three housing GSEs. A
major activity of the housing GSEs is to purchase mortgage loans
from originators like commercial and mortgage banks, and then package
them in the form of mortgage-backed securities, which are guaranteed
and sold to investors. The pool of outstanding government-related
mortgage securities amounted to $2.636 trillion at the end of the
second quarter of 2001. This figure includes mortgage-backed securities
from Ginnie Mae, the Veterans Administration, and the Federal Housing
Authority, which are not GSEs but instead are agencies of the federal
government carrying the full faith and credit of the government.
Direct government lending to financial intermediaries, which is
quite small today, dates from the creation of the discount facility
as part of the Federal Reserve Act, which became law in 1913. In
the early years of the Federal Reserve System, such loans were an
important source of funds to member banks. In the past decade, except
during episodes of financial stress, such as experienced in the
days following the September 11 terrorist attacks, the outstanding
amount of such loans has been very small. With the exception of
the seasonal borrowing facility, the maturities of such loans are
very short.
Another significant federal guarantee program arises through government
insurance of defined benefit pension plans, through the Pension
Benefit Guarantee Corporation. The PBGC was created by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. On September 30, 1998, the
present value of covered defined benefit pension plans was estimated
at $12.3 billion.
In discussing financial intermediaries and federal guarantee programs,
I have mentioned dollar amounts in the trillions. The scale of the
programs is comparable to the publicly held Treasury debt-often
called the "national debt"-which we also measure in the
trillions. These programs have significant effects on the capital
markets and raise many fascinating and difficult public policy issues.
The Federal Reserve's Role
No financial system works well, as experience around the world
has demonstrated often and painfully, in the face of monetary instability.
In the United States, the Federal Reserve has the essential responsibility
of maintaining low inflation and confidence that low inflation will
continue into the indefinite future. Without that confidence, the
bond market will have a tough time pricing long-term bonds, because
the future purchasing power of money will be uncertain. In countries
experiencing high inflation, long-term debt instruments literally
disappear. Funds can only be borrowed short term, if at all.
The importance of the Federal Reserve's role in the payments system
became fully evident on September 11 and the days immediately following.
The Fed provided an enormous amount of extra liquidity to the financial
system. The action was not a monetary policy action in the conventional
sense, but a response to the physical disruption of the payments
system.
To understand what the Fed did, consider your situation if your
income stopped, and you were unable to borrow funds, and you were
unable to sell securities because the markets were closed. Depending
on your access to cash, you would be forced, within a few days,
to default on bills coming due. Both nonfinancial and financial
firms are in a similar situation, except that financial firms especially
rely heavily on daily and even hourly receipts to meet obligations
to make payments of various sorts.
As a consequence of the terrorist attacks, the securities markets
closed, and so funds could not be raised that way. Moreover, the
attack caused serious disruption to the operations of several financial
firms that play a prominent role in clearing payments. Without certain
funds coming in, firms all over the United States, and all over
the world for that matter, would have been forced to default on
obligations. Let me emphasize that the funds due were indeed owed
to the recipient firms; the problem was that the physical destruction
and unavoidable delays in bringing backup systems and locations
to full operational capacity meant that the funds simply could not
be transmitted. In the absence of Fed intervention, we would have
seen a cascade of defaults as firms due funds that were not arriving
would be unable to meet their obligations. This default cascade
would have spread the problem throughout the world economic system.
The Fed provided extra liquidity to the markets in a variety of
ways after the terrorist attacks. One method was by making loans
through the discount window to depository institutions. Such loans
usually run a few hundred million dollars or so. On Wednesday, September
12 the outstanding volume of adjustment credit lent by the Fed to
depository institutions rose to $45.5 billion, up from $99 million
the Wednesday before. Those loans allowed banks to meet their obligations
even though expected receipts had not arrived, and allowed banks
to extend credit to their customers who could then make payments.
A large increase in Federal Reserve float was another mechanism
expanding liquidity. The Fed typically clears roughly one third
of the checks generated by the households and businesses that write
them. In the normal course of business, a bank receiving a check
may take it to the Fed, which then processes the check and sends
it on to the bank on which it was written. The dollar amount of
the check is added to the clearing account of one bank and deducted
from the account of the other bank. These clearing accounts are
maintained on the books of the Federal Reserve Banks.
Because many checks are transported by air, the grounding of all
aircraft meant that checks deposited with Fed for clearing could
not be delivered to the banks on which they were drawn. Moreover,
many banks that do not ordinarily use the Fed's check-processing
services brought their checks to the Fed for a few days after September
11. For both regular customers and these new customers, the Fed
gave credit for the balances deposited that vastly exceeded the
funds being deducted from the accounts of other banks; the difference
is called "Federal Reserve float." On Wednesday, September
12, float was $22.9 billion, up from $2.1 billion the previous Wednesday.
A third mechanism to inject liquidity into the banking system was
Fed purchases of securities in the open market. Fortunately, the
market mechanism, though severely impaired, was not completely broken.
The Open Market Desk at the New York Fed, itself operating from
a contingency site because its office near the World Trade Center
was closed, was able to purchase a large volume of securities through
a combination of outright purchases and temporary purchases under
repurchase agreements. Moreover, the Fed arranged currency swap
agreements with several foreign central banks, which enabled them
to provide dollars to their financial institutions.
All these mechanisms taken together expanded Federal Reserve credit
by $90 billion, or about 15 percent, between Wednesday, September
5 and Wednesday, September 12. As the financial system restored
normal payments mechanisms, and securities markets reopened, the
extra liquidity flowed back to the Federal Reserve. Loans at the
discount window were repaid, float declined as checks cleared, and
Open Market Desk purchases of securities under repurchase agreement
expired. Today, the system is functioning normally.
One other aspect of Fed operations deserves mention in this context.
On the afternoon of September 11, and to a lesser extent during
the days that followed, some banks experienced a modest increase
in demand for currency. Frightened depositors withdrew cash from
teller windows and ATMs. If those sources of cash had run dry, the
word would have spread rapidly that cash was running out, and additional
people would have lined up at ATMs to make their withdrawals. The
Fed made clear to depository institutions that cash was available,
and maintained operations to ensure that all demands could be met.
A modest amount of extra cash was shipped to banks requesting it.
I personally heard of no ATMs running dry, and in a matter of a
few days the extra demand for cash disappeared. Here again, the
Fed's role was to maintain normal functioning of the payments system,
and by doing so the Fed helped to maintain public confidence in
difficult and uncertain circumstances.
Federal Reserve payments system operations are ordinarily considered
a rather mundane subject. This experience shows, however, that under
conditions of stress the subject is far from mundane. A modern economy
depends critically on reliable methods to make and receive payment;
when those mechanisms fail, the economy itself cannot function.
The crisis of September 11 shows that the Federal Reserve plays
an important role in keeping the mechanics of the payments system
in good order. Doing so builds confidence across the economy that
this essential aspect of life will work in normal fashion.
Concluding Comment
The capital markets play a central role in a market economy. In
the United States, these markets have a heavy governmental presence,
but one that has evolved to differing degrees of government involvement
depending on the market being examined. For the most part, government
involvement in the primary security markets is relatively limited.
The federal and state and local governments do raise significant
amounts of funds in these markets, but the regulatory function is
concentrated in the area of requiring provision of accurate information.
Financial intermediaries play a significant role. They raise funds
from a variety of sources and make loans of many types. The federal
involvement with intermediaries ranges from a light touch to extensive
regulation and supervision.
Postscript
I chose my lecture topic long before September 11, and had in hand
a great deal of background work. But I think it would be a mistake
for me to stop now without commenting briefly on the likely economic
effects of the terrorist attacks.
The long-run prospects for the U.S. economy remain basically unaffected.
The dynamic nature of the economy has not been damaged. The prospects
for innovation, and the incentives to employ new technologies, have
not changed.
The short-run outlook is dominated by uncertainty. Forecasters,
required by their profession to put down numbers, show a much wider
range of views than usual. I know that every individual forecaster
has even less confidence than usual in the numbers written down.
The fact is that we have no close parallel in U.S. history to study
for guidance as to the likely course of the economy in the months
and quarters ahead. Moreover, as the anthrax situation so horribly
illustrates, we may have additional unpleasant surprises ahead of
us.
Some business analysts seem to use the word "uncertainty"
as a euphemism for "weakness," just as stock market analysts
seem to use the word "volatility" as a euphemism for "decline."
What I mean by uncertainty is that likely outcomes for the aggregate
economy over the next six to twelve months are spread across a range
from modestly poor to modestly good. Without question, the terrorist
attacks have hurt the aggregate economy over the near-term. However,
I do want to emphasize that we have very considerable strengths
in our situation. We should not be pessimistic. I am not saying
that I have a personal forecast of a quick rebound, but at the same
time neither do I have a sinking feeling. I am genuinely uncertain
about the economy's near-term outlook.
What are the strengths of the economy today? Most important, we
have a resilient people who are not going to sit back and watch
the situation deteriorate. We are a people who look ahead and do
not allow ourselves to wallow in fear. We are already acting to
address the problems we face. Our highly competitive markets are
flexible and responsive to changing circumstances. We already see
the airlines adjusting rapidly, by cutting routes where necessary
and adjusting fares downward to attract passengers. Auto companies
have zero-interest rate promotions, and indeed auto sales in early
October have been strong. Market after market is responding and
adjusting.
The rate of inflation is low and expected to remain low. In many
past periods of stress, rising inflation expectations have complicated
the situation tremendously. When the Korean War broke out in June
1950, there were immediate fears of a surge of inflation and of
goods shortages. Many hoarded goods and prices spiked up quickly,
unsettling the situation.
The U.S. banking system is strong, unlike the situation in August
1990 when the Gulf War broke out. At that time, the economy drifted
into recession, and the recovery that began officially in March
1991 was anemic. Part of the problem then was that a banking system
with a weak capital position was unable to expand loans even to
many credit-worthy borrowers. Today, bank capital is strong and
banks are able to lend to good risks.
A substantial amount of monetary and fiscal policy stimulus was
already in place before September 11; additional monetary policy
stimulus is in place now and more fiscal stimulus is in the works.
Most analysts believe that lost business on September 11 and the
days that followed was sufficient to nudge the economy's growth
rate in the third quarter below zero. If the fourth quarter is also
down, then the conventional shorthand definition of a recession-two
successive quarters with negative GDP growth-will be met. Some talk
as though that outcome is certain. It is not. We should not be surprised
if that is the outcome, but neither should we be surprised if the
fourth quarter shows positive growth.
The Federal Reserve will be watching the incoming data carefully,
as will the market. If necessary, more monetary policy ease will
be put in place. As data arrive suggesting revival of growth, we'll
have to watch to be sure that we are not observing a false dawn.
We'll also have to be careful not to overstay policy ease.
You may not find the economist's "on the one hand, on the
other hand" very satisfying, but it sure beats a firm commitment
to a policy course oblivious to developing information. That is
the situation we face. We in the Fed are paid to exercise our best
judgment. That is what we will do.
Thank you, and I'd be delighted to take some questions.
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